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Chapter 1
General Issues
1.1 Introduction
After more than thirty years of fruitless discussions and denial, the topic of
Global warming is on the global agenda nowadays. This year in spring, G8
leaders agreed on a reduction target of 20 per cent of their CO2 emissions and
in late autumn a United Nations conference in Bali shall find a way towards
a follow up treaty to the Kyoto Protocol.
Generally the world climate is affected by many factors, but the biggest
wedge is due to emission of so called greenhouse gases (GHGs). These are
permeable for sunbeams on the one side and they avert that the heat is
released from the atmosphere on the other side. As a result the world acts
like a greenhouse, which gives the effect its snappy name. The problems that
come along with global warming are manifold and the precise dimension of
the damages to be feared are not yet clear. However it is common sense that
these damages are going to be substantial and are basically caused by human
behavior. Here is a short overview to the upcoming threats1.
1Gabriel (2003): pp. 12 et seq.
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Rise of the Sealevel
Rising sealevels are a result of the expansion of heating water and the melting
of the glaciers. Estimates for the rise to be expected vary between 14 and
80 cm, but these are quite imprecise as many things have an effect on the
sealevel. A rise is threatening both the habitat of men and animals. Feeding
places of birds lie in coastal areas, breeding places of seals on the Greenland
ice melt and whole ecological systems in river deltas and lagoons are flooded.
On the other hand many countries of the world are in low lying areas, some
even below sealevel. Bangladesh and the Netherlands are the most popular
examples but many small groups of islands, that were on the news after the
tsunami catastrophe in 2004, could simply disappear from earth’s surface.
The cost of coastal protection and lost land area are enormous and can
be borne by economically developed countries but probably not by lesser
developed states2.
Shifting of the Climate
The increasing temperature changes the air humidity and hence the rainfall
frequency. The question arises whether the ecosystems can adapt at the same
speed. Generally, one assumes that the vegetation zones shift to the north.
While Mid- and Northern Europe might even profit from global warming,
other regions such as Southern Europe and many African states will suffer
from a strong increase of droughts3.
2Gabriel (2003): pp. 20-22
There is a lot more literature on the effects of global warming. Barrett (2003) or Nordhaus
and Boyer (2000) for instance give an overview. The report, which gathered the most
public attention, was published by former World Bank chief economist Nicholas Stern in
2006.
3Gabriel (2003): pp. 22-23
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Drinking Water Shortage
Similar to the point above, countries that have troubles with drinking water
provision will have even greater problems in the future. This is due to the
more widely spread aridity and to the rise of the sealevel. When the seas
raise, the groundwater reserves get contaminated by salty water. The results
are again manifold. As it was seen in Italy in spring this year, power plants
could not operate anymore as the level of many rivers was to low. The biggest
problem of course is the supply of the population and of the agriculture with
clean drinking water4.
Natural Disasters
Extreme weather events, like hurricanes or aridity, occur more and more of-
ten. Thereby they do even bigger harm, caused by floods or droughts for
instance5.
The points mentioned above describe causes and their effects that are
going to arrive sooner or later. The motivation to choose the topic of global
warming for my thesis was to find out why, despite of all these threats, there
were no changes towards a more sustainable world economy. I wanted to
know how a framework must be built in order to sustain an ecologically
bearable level of worldwide emissions. Therefore I start with describing the
regime, that should regulate countries emissions nowadays, namely the Kyoto
protocol. My aim is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the Kyoto
system. In the next chapter I list theoretical considerations about interna-
tional environmental agreements. The problem is, that full cooperation of
all states of the world would be desirable, but it does not appear in practice,
as there are to many incentives to act unilaterally. To see why this is the
case, I chose two models that describe symmetric games with external costs
and limited participation. The main difference between those models are the
4Gabriel (2003): pp. 23-24
5Gabriel (2003): pp. 24-25
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number of attending countries and that while the first one uses comparative
statics the second one is a dynamic game. In the third chapter I establish a
framework in which fully cooperation is possible, and in which the extent of
cooperation, i.e. the decrease of GHG emissions, depends on more factors,
such as technology or population that differ among the countries. In the last
step I look at what happens when technology is improving and population is
growing.
1.2 Why Kyoto?
A good example, out of the dozens of existing environmental treaties, for a
successful international cooperation is the Montreal Agreement of 1989. It
was an attempt to regulate the emission of CFC gases to conserve the ozone
layer of the earth. Similar to the Kyoto Protocol it embodies exceptions
as well as transfers of technology and money for developing countries. The
crucial difference is that CFC is not a substantial production factor in the
global economy. In contrast almost nothing can be produced or transported
without the use of fossil resources6.
In 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) took place in Rio de Janeiro. There, the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed. It was the first
time that goals to sustain the environment were binding by international law.
A foresight principle was introduced, stating that even if the exact damages
can not be evaluated yet, measures are taken to regulate global warming. On
the World Climate Summit in Berlin in 1995 the parties agreed on the Berlin
Mandate, which opened the door for the amendment protocol for concrete
commitment for industrialized nations. These principles were then imple-
mented in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.7
6Barrett and Stavins (2003): pp. 365
7Barrett and Stavins (2003): pp. 351-353
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1.2.1 Objectives and Coming into Force
The GHGs whose emission is regulated in the protocol are the following:
Carbon-Dioxide (CO2, which acts as a benchmark for the other gases in
so called CO2 equivalent metric tons), Methane (CH4), Di-Nitrogen (N2O),
Hydroflourocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur hexafluo-
ride (SF6). The industrialized countries, listed in Annex B of the treaty,
appointed to reduce their annual emission of CO2 equivalent tons by around
five per cent on average in the period from 2008 to 2012 compared to their
emissions in 1990. The respective countries have individual guidelines, that
depend mainly on their economic standards. The European Union should
reduce its emissions by eight per cent, Russia and Ukraine agreed on not
exceeding their 1990 values while developing and emerging countries such as
China have no binding goals to achieve.
The protocol should become effective as soon as 55 countries that represent
55 per cent of the world CO2 emissions have ratified it. The number of 55
contracting states was reached rather soon, relative to the other criterion.
Because the United States had first signed the treaty, but then did not ratify
it, it seemed to have failed. But in 2005 Russia, which is responsible for
about 18 per cent of worldwide emissions, agreed on the Kyoto targets and
so the protocol finally came into effect. The critical point is, that Russia
does not need to reduce its emissions at all. Because most of the Sowiet
Union’s production facilities broke down after 1990, in fact it could produce
32 per cent higher emissions and would still fulfill its obligations. The same
is true for all other former communist countries in Eastern Europe and for
Germany who bears (and in this case actually profits) the heritage of the old
DDR industries. All in all the abatement supported by the Kyoto Protocol
is too modest compared to the optimal results, stated in the literature8. This
is one of the main points of criticism together with the fact that developing
countries need not reduce their emissions at all. As it can be seen in the
graph below, even these moderate targets will not be reached by most of the
8Nordhaus and Boyer (2000): pp. 152; Dutta and Radner (2005): pp. 11-15
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countries, especially in the European Union. For instance, while the Euro-
pean Union agreed on reduction targets of eight per cent, it actually just cut
its emissions by 0.6 per cent, Luxembourg agreed on a decrease of -28 but
increased its emissions by 0.3 per cent, Denmark and Germany each with -21
per cent have the most ambitious targets, and both did not meet them. The
biggest increase was allowed for Spain, Greece and Portugal with +15, +25
and +27 per cent, but in fact they raised their emissions by +49, +26.6 and
+41 per cent.
8
One reason for that might be that the protocol does not include real
punishment. A country that exceeds its obligations by one ton emitted GHGs
is punished by a reduction of its emission rights in the next period by one ton
plus a 30 per cent ’fee’. That means that if for instance Germany emits one
ton of CO2 equivalents too much in 2007, its reduction targets for 2008 are
automatically reduced by 1.3 tons. But if there is no institution that ensures
that the fees are paid, no country has to fear the punishment and it will not
work this way9. In the later chapters I will further explain the importance
of the credibility of punishment in this topic.
1.2.2 Flexible Mechanisms
The Kyoto Protocol includes some flexible marked based mechanisms, which
shall help the signatory states to achieve their objectives. These mechanisms
are voluntary:
• Emissions Trading
The trade with emission entitlements is one of the main instruments
of the protocol. The idea is, that emissions are reduced where it can
be done in the most cost efficient way. Every Annex B country has a
certain annual contingent of emissions. Every country distributes these
entitlements to its domestic firms. But the firms get less certificates
as they would need without improving their production technologies.
So every company can decide if it wants to use cleaner technologies to
reach the goal or buy certificates from other firms in order to be able to
produce. So firms with lower abatement costs get supported by having
emission certificates for sale, while those companies who cannot or are
not willing to cut down emissions get punished. This is a market driven
way to shift production to more efficient firms.
The first period of emission trading did not bring the results wanted as
too many entitlements where given to the firms. So the price for one
9Barrett and Stavins (2003): pp. 352
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ton of CO2 was to low to have any effect.
• Joint Implementation
Joint Implementation (JI) stands for cooperative measures of two or
more industrialized countries. The reduction resulting from that coop-
eration can be credited to the emission account of both countries. That
makes it possible for countries with relatively high specific costs of emis-
sion reduction to follow their obligations by investing in countries that
have relatively low abatement costs. For example, in Austria factories
are obliged by law to use filtering systems to bind a certain percentage
of CO2 and sulfur of its exhausts. In eastern European countries the
environmental standards for producers are lower, and hence the intro-
duction of already developed filtering systems is cheaper then inventing
new technologies in order to reduce the same amount of emissions in
Austria.
The JI-mechanism was introduced with regard to the Annex B coun-
tries in Eastern Europe. Additional to a decrease of CO2 emission, the
necessary technological progress for the former soviet countries should
be supported.
• Clean Development Mechanism
One speaks of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), when an indus-
trialized country takes action to reduce GHG emissions in an underde-
veloped country. Because the harm done to the climate is independent
of the place of emission of the pollutant, every reduction is an improve-
ment to the current state. So on the one hand cost efficient actions give
a chance for Annex B nations to achieve their aim and on the other
hand it supports the transfer of technology to developing countries.
Again the reduction of GHG emissions achieved will be credited to both
countries.
• Burden Sharing
It is possible for a group of contracting states to fulfill their obligations
10
together. For example, the European Union committed to cut down
its emissions by eight per cent. Inside the union the burdens are allo-
cated totally different. Luxembourg with -28 per cent, Denmark and
Germany each with -21 per cent have the most ambitious targets.
The biggest increase was allowed for Spain, Greece and Portugal with
+15, +25 and +27 per cent. This is a quite reasonable apportionment,
as it refers mainly to the economically capability of the member states.
The other side of the coin is that a cut down on emissions is costly as
well. New technologies have to be developed and reduction of energy use
goes hand in hand with lower production and thus lower income.
Now that the general problem is defined, I want to turn to more theoretical
points of view of the issue.
11
Chapter 2
Games with incomplete
Participation
The literature on the subject of environmental agreements, is always con-
cerned with two issues. First of all a country must be willing to participate
in a treaty. And once a country has signed an agreement, it has to be clar-
ified that compliance should be the only possible behavior of the signatory
state. The problem is, that as soon as a country agreed on an environmental
treaty it might be in its interest to produce more GHGs than it is allowed to
in order to increase its national welfare. A situation like this can, of course,
never be an equilibrium.
In the first section I have a look at the question, what makes an agree-
ment efficient, fair and what possibilities are there to prohibit countries from
breaking the rules. Then I present three models that compare fully coopera-
tive outcomes with non cooperative results. The basic structure they use to
improve the non cooperative situation is somewhat similar, but the models
differ in the number of cooperating states.
The first model concludes that only a small group of countries can form a
reasonable agreement, depending on how big the gains from cooperation are.
The second model only considers two countries deciding whether to work to-
gether or not. The last system I am looking at is the most sophisticated one.
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It includes efficient CO2 reduction of all countries of the world and further-
more deals with issues such as population growth and technological progress,
what the first two do not at all. What all the models have in common is that
they allow for self enforcing mechanisms. So the result of the game is that it
is in the own interest of any country to follow the rules.
2.1 Basic Considerations
Not participating would be the most obvious way of free riding. When a
country decides to sign a contract, it must then be willing to comply the
rules even if individual gains from a deviation were possible. This form of
free riding has to be monitored by institutions.
Cost effectiveness of the emission reducing mechanisms seems to play an im-
portant role for compliance. On the other hand it is impossible to fulfill that
demand, without full participation of all countries.
An efficient and cost effective climate treaty could sustain full cooperation of
each state. There every country would reduce its emissions to the level where
its own marginal abatement costs were equal to the sum of global marginal
profits. In contrast to the situation where there is no treaty, every country
would be better off or at least not worse off1. This might only be possi-
ble with transfers of money, technology or tradeable emission entitlements.
This transfers might also be necessary in order to make a treaty ’fair’ in the
sense of richer countries bearing higher burdens than poorer ones. And fur-
thermore, without transfers some countries will only be willing to cut down
emissions up to that point, where their own marginal benefit equals its own
costs2.
The authors argue that it is a common mistake in theoretical literature, that
participation and compliance are treated as one problem. For Barrett and
Stavins it is a separated problem that has to be dealt with jointly. It can be
1Barrett and Stavins (2003): pp. 358
2see also Barrett and Stavins (2003): pp. 361 - 362
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counterproductive if there are countries, who are not part of GHG reducing
agreement. As the member countries will have costs to lower emissions, they
make themselves worse off in terms of comparative advantages. It follows
that countries, that did not sign the treaty, will attract emission intensive
production but will carry it out with older and hence more polluting tech-
nology. This process is called emission leakage and if it is positive, i.e. that
the stock of worldwide emissions grows, cooperation would need to be fully
to avoid that.
Barrett and Stavins consider three possibilities of positive incentive setting3:
• Side payment
A direct money transfer paid by one or more countries to another.
Probably those countries who gain most from a emission reduction
support those, who might even have higher cost than profits.
• Issue linkage
A less pleasant word for this is horse trade. One country participates in
an agreement and in return in another negotiation issue, it gets special
conditions, for instance higher quotas in international trade.
• Emission entitlements
To make a country participate it is granted more emission entitlements.
As some countries have higher marginal costs of emission abatement,
they will be willing to pay for other countries emission rights. This
mechanism is assumed to be the most efficient and acts similar as side
payments. Trading therefore promotes participation in the treaty.
And they also list three possibilities of negative incentives to make the
parties comply. They argue that the threat of punishment must always be
credible. This is very problematic in the case, where the punishing countries
harm themselves. So all in all a nation must be better off, after punishing
the deviant state. On the other side, a threat must be sufficiently severe.
3For more detailed proposals, see also Aldy, Orszag and Stiglitz (2001)
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If a member of the treaty does not fear the threat it has low incentives to
comply4:
• Reciprocal measures
If one country brakes the rules and emits more than it agreed on, the
other signatories of the contract will pollute more in return. Accord-
ing to the authors it is less credible that all nations take part in the
punishing process, the more parties are involved in the punishment.
• Financial penalties
A treatment could include the possibility of imposing a financial penalty
on the deviant. For example, when a country exceeds its quota of
emissions, it has to pay a certain amount of money per ton of additional
CO2. This alternative is more attractive as none of the cooperating
states must sacrifice something in order to punish the non cooperating
country. But the problem is, that what is the punishment if the country
does not pay the fine? An even higher fine in the next period, that can
not be collected won’t produce the result we are looking for. And
furthermore if the penalty is to high, a country will just decide not to
participate at first.
• Trade restrictions
For instance, if a country that does not participate in an emission
reducing agreement wants to sell something to a country that partici-
pates. It is part of the treaty that in this case the participating country
would be allowed to ask for a special tax that represents the marginal
abatement costs of, say, one ton of CO2 reduction. The idea is to shift
production towards countries who do participate in such a treaty. The
weakness of this approach is, that it might conflict with other contracts
a country is obliged to. For instance in the WTO such conditions would
be seen as discrimination of a member country and conflict with the
equal treatment commitment.
4Barrett and Stavins (2003): pp. 362
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A last possibility to cut down emissions would be to introduce technolog-
ical standards, such as a catalyst for cars. But these standards tend to result
only in short term reductions and not in abatement in the long run. Further-
more it seems that standards slow technological progress as they promote
one solution for many users5.
2.2 A Static Game
The concept that was used by Scott Barrett (1994) in his article ”Self-
Enforcing International Environmental Agreements” is not new, but quite
suitable for that kind of problem. In fact, it is so useful that most authors
writing on the topic of global warming apply it. In short, there are two states
of the world. One would be ’natural’, considering economic rationalism, in
the sense that all agents maximize their own profits subject to their own
costs. Unfortunately in this framework we allow for external cost, which
means that actions taken by one party affect all other parties in the game.
So a possibility to make everyone better off would be to cooperate in order
to regulate the global common in a way that is bearable for all agents in-
volved. But as soon as some countries cooperate, it becomes profitable for
others to free ride. So the basic problem can be taken as a simple ’Prisoners
Dilemma’. In the one shot game, where the cooperative outcome is compared
with the deviating outcome, in which all players maximize their individual
profits, the result will never be full cooperation. In the models, that will
be introduced now, cooperation can have two meanings. In the first model
the level of abatement of emissions is the decision variable where the total
amount emitted is of interest in the models two and three. Comparing these
models shows very well the evolution from static to dynamic modeling and
from limited participation to a framework in which full participation can be
achieved.
In this model countries have two possibilities when they have to decide on
5Barrett and Stavins (2003). pp. 368-369
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what to do. They can set individual marginal cost of abatement either equal
to individual marginal benefit of abatement, or equal to global marginal ben-
efit of abatement. If marginal costs are small and marginal benefits are big,
the international cooperation won’t bear large gains as each country can
profit a lot by acting unilaterally. When costs are large and benefits are
small it is unlikely that the countries will cut down their pollution by high
amounts, because low emissions are already a dominant strategy. Finally
the gains to cooperation are larger if the ratio of marginal costs to global
marginal benefits is close to one and the gap between cooperative and non
cooperative emission abatement is big6.
To make the agents cooperate in the prisoners dilemma, the game is repeated
such that it is possible to punish one player for bad behavior. We have to
write down two incentive constraints to ensure sustainability of the equilib-
rium. No signatory of the treaty should be able to attain additional profits
from cheating and that the agreement is renegotiation proof. If the contract
would be subject to further negotiations after the treaty is signed, nobody
would be willing to comply as the result could be changed afterwards again.
The crucial point in the repeated game is the value of the discount factor,
i.e. the lower the better7. It means that the more patient the players are,
the more they take into account future costs of environmental harm.
2.2.1 The Model
The framework contains i = 1, ...I identical players, individual emission
abatement qi and following abatement cost Ci(qi) = cq
2
i and abatement ben-
efits Bi(Q) = b(oQ − Q2/2)I, where Q = ∑Ii=1 qi is global GHG reduction.
When the cooperating states manage to cut the emissions of the global pollu-
tant by a total number of Q, every country benefits according to the benefit
6Barrett (1994): pp. 881 - 882
7Note that the discount rate r, that is applied in this and the following model, is
different from the discount factor δ, which is used in the models of Dutta and Radner.
While r close to zero means high patience, the opposite is true for δ, where δ = 11−r
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function Bi(Q). The cost is only depending on national effort, and c repre-
sents the slope of the marginal costs curve. Note that in this first of three
models, the parameter of interest is abatement level and not the level of
emissions, as it will be seen afterwards8.
Two Benchmarks
In this section I describe two different states of the world. In the first one,
no country is willing to sign a treaty so there is no coordinated way of emis-
sions reduction. In the second state, at least some countries agree on joint
abatement levels at which joint utility should be maximized. Individual net
gains of abatement are denoted by pii = Bi(Q)− Ci(qi), further more global
net gains are Π =
∑
i pii. If all countries would cooperate, their marginal
abatement cost Ci(qi) would equal the global marginal benefit of emission
reduction (MB). On the other side, countries set their level of abatement by
maximizing their individual pii, under the assumption that all others actions
are given. This non cooperative behavior will be called ’Business as Usual’
(BAU). Comparing the outcomes, it follows that the cooperative GHG level
Qc is lower than the BAU one Qn. As countries are identical, optimal emis-
sion commitments are the same for all players. Qc and qc stand for coop-
erative emission abatement, while Qn and qn represent the non cooperative
outcome:
qn =
o
I(1 + c
b
)
< qc =
o
I + c
b
Qn =
o
1 + c
b
< Qc =
oI
I + c
b
where o, b and c are constants. If there is no cooperation it makes
sense to work together at some level, whilst if there is full cooperation it is
individually rational to choose lower abatement than agreed on. Therefor a
8Barrett (1994), pp. 880
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fraction  of all countries will sign a treaty, while a proportion of (1 − ) of
all states will refuse to do so9.
As this is a symmetric game, the payoffs are the same for all countries.
Both benchmarks represent all future payoffs for player i from the point in
time, when the decision is made. So both players decide at the same time,
say t = 0, on their expected future welfare. And both have expectations of
what the other state might do in the future.
How to sustain low emission levels?
It is known that cooperation can be sustained when the game is played not
only once but infinitely often. So when players do not act as they were sup-
posed to do, the other players can punish the deviant after the next round.
The severance depends amongst others on how long the punishment phase
lasts. The punishment may only last for one repetition but as well until the
end of the game, which would be infinity in this case. The crucial question
is whether the possibility of punishing a country, which deviates from the
agreement it signed, is a credible threat. When a country believes that it
is really going to get punished after a deviation, it will cooperate when the
costs of punishment are higher than the benefits of a single deviation.
Usually the punishment is carried out by the complying I - 1 states by re-
ducing the contribution to the public good. In the logic of the model, fewer
abatement leads to lower benefits. Every country compares the sum of all
future benefits resulting from cooperation with the one of not cooperating.
When it can be assured that all cooperating countries contribute to the pun-
ishment of a single deviating state, the coalition is sustainable. The optimal
number of the members of the coalition is reached, when a further cooperat-
ing state can not improve the joint utility of the coalition any more.
The model leads to the conclusion, that the smaller the number of partic-
ipating parties is, the larger is the reduction of emissions, that will be agreed
on by the signatories. The problem here is the credibility of punishment. As
9Barrett (1994), pp. 880-881
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soon as there is only the slightest possibility that after a deviation the treaty
would be renegotiated or some states might not punish, in order to avoid to
harm themselves, there is no equilibrium. In other words if the punishment
itself is not an equilibrium, there is no way to threat a country from deflec-
tion.
This result is not satisfactory, so I am looking for other conditions that might
achieve better findings, in terms of international participation and substan-
tial emission reduction.
2.3 A Dynamic Game
The paper of Dockner and Long (1992) ”International Pollution Control: Co-
operative versus Noncooperative Strategies” appeared two years earlier than
the preceding one by Barrett, but contained already dynamic modeling. This
bears in mind that the history of a country’s actions may be influenced by
any other country’s behavior in the past. When a country realizes, that its
own behavior, i.e. its own emissions, influences the behavior of an other state
in the future, it might act according to another strategy10.
The players act according to so called Markovian strategies. For these strate-
gies the complete history of the game, say all emissions in former periods,
are not of importance but only the state of the system, in this case aggregate
emissions. One assumes that the stock of GHGs itself gives an information
about past actions. The analysis focuses on so called Markov Perfect Equi-
libria (MPE), which are a subgame perfect equilibrium in Markov strategies.
Dockner and Long see clear advantage for this dynamic modeling, because of
its capability to show when and why negotiations about emission reductions
fail, how they are accomplished and why the countries have an incentive to
deviate after signing a treaty11.
10Dockner and Long (1992): pp. 14
11Dockner and Long (1992): pp. 13-14
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As I already mentioned at the beginning, only two identical countries are
playing in this game. To be able to compare the results of the game, again
two benchmarks are computed. The first one is the fully cooperative outcome,
that itself is not sustainable in a one shot game, as it does not constitute
an equilibrium. The second case is the one, where all countries maximize
their national welfare, which bears the result that a global pollutant harms
both countries. As in the previous paper and in contrast to the following the
authors assume punishment as not fully credible12.
2.3.1 The Model
Two neighboring countries produce a consumption good Xi. The good is
produced using a technology Fi. As a side effect, during the production
process an amount of pollutants ai per unit of good is generated, thus Xi =
Fi(ai). Actual GHG emissions contribute to the global stock g(t):
g˙(t) = a1(t) + a2(t)− (1− σ)g(t), (1− σ) > 0
where (1− σ) is the amount of CO2, that is dissipated in one period. N
consumers in each country, derive utility Ui(Xi) by consumption of good Xi.
Overall pollution causes environmental costs Ci(g) for country i, that have
to be subtracted to calculate national net benefits of country i Bi:
Bi(ai(t), g(t)) = Ui
[
Fi(ai(t))
]
− Ci(g(t))
The difference between the preceding and this model is, that here a dy-
namic modeling is utilized. Each player choses optimal behavior by maxi-
mizing a discounted13 integral, representing its total net benefits14:
12Dockner and Long (1992): pp. 14-15
13Remember: r 6= δ!
14Dockner and Long (1992): pp. 16
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maxai
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
Bi(ai(t), g(t)
)
dt, s.t. g˙(t)
So every government aims to maximize the stream of collective welfare of
its own country.
Two Benchmarks
Again I utilize the already known concept. In the first step I calculate the
non cooperative state of the world in which every player only considers his
own emissions. In the second step I calculate the joint welfare of the two
players, in which the countries cooperate in order to attain higher welfare.
For calculating any outcome, I firstly need to specify a profit function pii for
country i. Preferences are denoted by Ui[Fi(ai(t))] = γai(t) − 12a2i (t) (γ > 0
being a constant), as well as the cost function Ci(g(t)) =
s
2
g2(t). Now I can
write:
pii(ai(t)) = γai(t)− 1
2
a2i (t)−
s
2
g2(t)
When both players do not cooperate, they play according to linear Marko-
vian strategies. That means that country i decides on its emission strategy
in period t according to the following rule:
ai(g(t)) = oi − big(t)
where oi and bi are constants. In equilibrium bi will be > 0, so when
the stock of GHG is large, both countries will have an incentive to cut down
their CO2 emissions.
The second case is the one where countries cooperate, so this time joint utility
is maximized instead of national utility. For computing global welfare, we
only have to combine the individual utility functions to a joint one, including
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the law of motion of g(t). As we use dynamic programming mechanisms, we
have to utilize a so called Hamiltonian instead of the La Grange function15:
H(a1, a2, g, λ) = γ(a1 + a2)− 1
2
(a21 + a
2
2)− sg2 + λ[a1 + a2 − (1− σ)g]
We have to take the first derivative of the Hamiltonian and set it equal to
zero. The solution to this maximization problem is again a symmetric one16.
How to sustain low emission levels?
The authors argue that in the case of no cooperation and a discount fac-
tor high enough, the loss of welfare to both neighbors exceeds the abatement
costs, incurred in the case of cooperation. So both countries would gain more
if they reduce their emissions. Furthermore they say that it is not necessary
to monitor the opponents behavior, as it is in everyones self interest to cut
down the pollutant, and - given a very low discount rate r ≈ 0 - it is even
possible to achieve the same reduction as in the fully cooperative setting.
That means that it might not be necessary to threaten the other country in
order to make it cooperate.
Despite the fine result of cooperation without punishment, the model
does not satisfy the demand for a broader solution. Although the dynamic
framework, in which goods production and interrelation between the acting
parties are the clue variables, is already a very reasonable approach it covers
only two players, which is barely enough considering a global problem. Fur-
thermore, it does not at all take into account any other factor like population,
technology, trade and different country sizes.
15a1 + a2 is the sum of the two players’ emissions
16Dockner and Long (1992), pp. 17-18
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Chapter 3
Games with complete
Participation
3.1 A Dynamic Game
In 2002 Dutta and Radner published their first work on the topic of global
warming. They wanted to show that it is possible to construct a game, in
which more than 200 players could agree on cooperation for the purpose of
reducing a global ’bad’. Step by step they upgraded the system towards more
realistic assumptions and broader coverage of circumstances that influence
the decision of every agent in every period.
The idea was the following: a solution for the problem of global warming
must be as easy as possible. Otherwise it would be extremely difficult to
convince the decision makers of the concept. And if the solution is relatively
easy, compared to the situation we have nowadays (in the sense of complex
internationl legal regulations) it would be easy to put it into practice. This
is a global problem but there is no global administration, that is capable of
enforcing international rules. So the only possibility for sustainable solutions
are agreements that are incentive compatible for the signatories, in other
words self enforcing1. The idea is the following. In order to sustain a low level
1Dutta and Radner (2006): pp. 252
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of worldwide emissions at least close to the first best solution, we introduce
two different types of punishment. The first one to be dealt with is a Third
Best Solution, which will be improved to a Second Best Optimum in a second
step.
3.1.1 The Model
Emissions are produced by production and consumption of energy and as
well by production of goods. Thus higher emissions go along with higher
production and, up to a point, with higher welfare. Every country contributes
to a global stock of GHGs by producing emissions:
A(t) =
I∑
i=1
ai(t)
The existing stock dissipates with a constant rate over time:
g(t+ 1) = A(t) + σg(t)
I players, i=1,...I, participate in the game. In fact more then 200 countries
of the world are the players. But the countries can differ in their population-
size, their emission technology and their preferences2. Nevertheless there are
regions of the world, such as Western and Eastern Europe, North America
and Asia, that have maybe not the same but at least similar strategic inter-
ests. In the basic model there is no population growth and no possibility of
changing the production technology. That means that there is no technolog-
ical progress.
Every country has a utility function, that is represented by its national GDP
minus the costs of the stock of GHG:
υi(t) = hi[ai(t)]− cig(t)
2In contrast to the other models, where countries were homogeneous
25
where ai(t) are country i’s emissions in period t
3. An example of h with
three inputs could be:
hi[ai(t)] = φiK
γi
i P
1−γi−βi
i
(
ai(t)
fi
)βi
− pi
(
ai(t)
fi
)
where K indicates capital use, P stands for the population level and a
f
describes the energy use of the economy4. This function is based on the
Sollow Model and thus it is concave. So we can assume that for a given
population, there is an optimal level of emissions.
In the model the national discounted welfare is the decision variable:
υi =
∞∑
t=0
δtυi(t)
where discount factor δ is the same for all countries.
Every country has a set of strategies σi ≡ [σi0, σi1, ...σit, ...], that maps the
way from a certain history (past emission, stock of GHG) to a certain action
(current emission). At a certain period t, the history of the game can be seen
as the history of all GHG stocks until then. Moreover, the total discounted
payoff is conditioned on each profile σ and each initial stock of GHG, g0:
υi(σ, go) ≡
∞∑
t=0
δtυi(t;σ, g0) (3.1)
If player i considers only last year’s emissions the strategy is a so called
Markovian Strategy. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a profile of Markovian
strategies that constitutes a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame (Subgame
3fi tells us how clean a technology is and because ai(t) = ei(t)fi, the lower fi the
cleaner a technology is
4By now it is sufficient to let h only depend on a, because the other factors K,P and
f are constant here. In the following chapter we will see what happens, when population
grows and technology improves
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Perfect Nash Equilibrium in Markovian strategies)5. These strategies are
functions that map the current state, (g, P), into a current action, ai, in-
cluding the past states and emissions of all states. A stationary strategy for
country i is a function that maps the current stock of GHG into a current
action, ai(t). A Markov Nash Equilibrium is a Nash Equilibrium in which
the strategies of all countries are stationary6.
Two Benchmarks
Business as Usual (BAU)
Again I define two benchmark levels of CO2 emissions, to have a point of
reference when looking at possible equilibria. This equilibrium corresponds
to the ’Tragedy of the Commons’. Each country plays a Markovian strategy,
in which it maximizes its utility subject to its own emissions. As a result,
the amount of GHGs emitted by all players exceeds a globally sustainable
level. Therefore we need to introduce a new function Vi that defines the total
discounted utility of country i:
Vi(g) =
(
hi(ai)− δ
[
ci
1−δσ
]
A
)
1− δ −
(
ci
1− δσ
)
g
The ’optimal level of emissions’ is implicitly defined by setting the first
derivative of Vi equal zero. That gives the highest welfare attainable for
country i in the BAU (all results related to the BAU are marked with a*):
∂Vi(g)
∂ai
= 0
h
′
i(a
∗
i ) = δwi
5Dutta and Radner (2002): pp. 7
A more precise definition of Markov perfect equilibrium can be seen in Sundaram (1999):
pp. 271 et seq.
6Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 257
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Introducing this emission level into the utility function gives the BAU
values of the crucial variables of this model, namely the discounted cost of
the stock of emissions w, the ’value’ of an emission strategy u and the sum
of all players emissions A7:
V ∗i (g) = u
∗
i − wig,
wi =
ci
1− δσ ,
u∗i =
hi(a
∗
i )− δwiA∗
1− δ ,
A∗ =
∑
j
a∗j
Global Pareto Optima (GPO)
After defining the worst case scenario, it is good to know, what could be
reached when nations cooperate. There are special weights given to every
countries utility, that sum up to one. Using these weights, we form a weighted
sum of all countries utility functions and call that global welfare8:
υ =
∑
i
xiυi
Considering this weighted sum, the utility function V can be rewritten
the following way:
Vi(g) =
(∑
xihi(ai)− δ
[∑
xici
1−δσ
]
A
)
1− δ −
(∑
xici
1− δσ
)
g
A GPO is a profile in which the discounted sum of all future payoffs Vi
of the function above is maximized over the amount of worldwide emitted
gases:
7Dutta and Radner (2002): pp. 9-10
8One could criticise the point, that it would be difficult to negotiate these weights. But
the weights are not the crucial factors, which will be shown soon
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∂Vi(g)
ai
= 0
xih
′
i(âi) = δw ⇔ h
′
i(âi) =
(
1
xi
)
δw
where â is the GPO emission level. When implementing tis GPO value â
into V, we get the respective values for V̂ , w and Â:
V̂ (g) = û− wg,
w =
1
1− δσ
∑
i
xici,
û =
∑
i xihi(âi)− δwÂ
1− δ ,
Â =
∑
i
âi
And again we define implicitly the optimal emissions, but this time the
sum of all ai’s does not exceed the global sustainable level.
Comparison of the Results
One can show that GPO emission levels are always lower than the BAU ones,
by comparing the results above:
h
′
i(a
∗
i ) =
δci
1− δσ
h
′
i(âi) =
δ
∑
i xici
xi(1− δσ)
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Now I want to show that the BAU level is higher than the GPO one. As
the function h is concave, it is logical that the slope of hi at the coordinate
âi must be steeper the at a
∗
i , if âi is smaller then a
∗
i :
h
′
i(a
∗
i ) < h
′
i(âi)
δci
1− δσ <
δ
∑
i xici
xi(1− δσ)
ci <
∑
i xici
xi
cixi <
∑
i
xici
which holds for all welfare weights xi.
In a BAU all countries consider only their national marginal cost but not the
cost occurring to other states due to its emissions. In a GPO the countries
take these additional cost into account. Both results share the characteristic
that the emission levels of the players, a∗i (t) and âi(t) respectively, are con-
stant over time, which is part of the particular strategies GPO and BAU.
Furthermore due to the linearity of the stock growth and cost of pollution,
marginal cost is not depending on the current amount of GHG in the atmo-
sphere9.
3.1.2 Third Best Optimum (TBO)
Now that we know the two extreme position between whose borders the
possible equilibria lie, we introduce a sanctioning mechanism, that should
ensure that the countries do not emit to high levels of CO2. The question is,
whether this level coincides with the GPO level or is higher than that.
The idea is that if one country decides to emit more than it is entitled to,
all other countries emit at the BAU level forever. This grim trigger strategy
results in the Third Best Optimum (TBO). In equilibrium the weighted sum
9Dutta and Radner (2002): pp. 8-10
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of all countries utility functions are maximized, as it was done before in the
GPO case. But now the solution must fulfill an incentive constraint. Namely
that country i’s welfare is higher (at least not smaller) at the compliance
level a˜ then at the BAU level a∗i :
[
hi(a˜i)− cig + δ[u˜i − wi(σg + A˜)]
]
≥
[
hi(a
∗
i )− cig + δ[u∗i − wi(σg + A˜
′
)]
]
where A˜ =
∑
j
a˜j and A˜
′
= a∗i +
∑
j 6=i
a˜j ∀ai, i
hi(ai)−cig is the direct nominal payoff minus country i’s cost of pollution,
and the following term δ[ui−wi(σg+∑j aj)] is the discounted utility minus
the discounted national costs of g in period t. On the left hand side (lhs)
every country acts according to the treaty, while on the right hand side (rhs)
country i plays a deviating strategy10. The inequality shows that it does
not pay to defect, as the punishment makes the deflector worse off. Because
a∗i > a˜i, it follows that costs are higher and hence welfare is lower.
Because the emissions are constant over time and the term ui includes the
sum of all countries emissions, it is not necessary to consider the steady state
g any more11. Hence we can rewrite the constraint in a shorter form:
[
hi(a˜i)− δwia˜i + δu˜i
]
≥
[
hi(a
∗
i )− δwia∗i + δu∗i
]
, ∀ai, i
This procedure bears many different findings. In the following I want to
present numerical analysis that shows that when the discount factor exceeds
a certain benchmark level δ and the weights are equally distributed (xi = xj),
the TBO solution can be equivalent with the GPO.
The next step is to have a look at all the equilibria, sustainable by BAU
threat, and find the one that has the smallest overall emission level A of the
10the authors write a instead of a∗ in their paper, but as the deviation profits are
maximized at the BAU emission level I cut this step short
11Remember u∗i =
hi(a
∗
i )−δwi
∑
a∗i
1−δ , u˜i =
hi(a˜i)−δwi
∑
a˜i
1−δ
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whole set. I call this result the Minimum Emissions Solution (Min) which
is unique and of course the emission level is lower then the BAU one. It
is possible that the minimum emission level can be even smaller than the
GPO for most countries12. At first sight, this seems to be a pretty good
solution to the problems discussed at the beginning. But in fact it could
become problematic if the punishment is so strict. When the emission levels
fall below the optimal level, it means that production is too low and thus
resulting in welfare losses. When the gains of an healthier environment are
lower than abatement costs, it is of course not an efficient system.
3.1.3 Second Best Optimum (SBO)
The Set of Equilibrium Payoffs
The modeling enables infinitely many equilibria, as there are infinitely many
levels of emissions that can be produced by the countries. The functional
frame is multivariable and is called a correspondence. Here a fixed point in
the correspondence, is the amount of GHGs emitted at which no country has
an incentive to act differently. The correspondence can have various fixed
points13.
In this chapter we have a closer look at these equilibria of the game which are
subgame perfect (SPE). The set of equilibrium outcomes at a point in time
g = 0 can be transformed linearly to another set of equilibrium outcomes at
any other level of g14. So the possible set of equilibria can be independent of
g, which means that the decision on the emission levels in period t need not
depend on the past emissions. But emissions a can be varying with the stock
g. The set of all solutions consists of all equilibrium payoff vectors, including
all possible SPE starting at a special g.
12Dutta and Radner (2002): pp. 14-15
13Mas-Colell, Winston and Green (1995): pp. 949 et seq.
14Dutta and Radner (2002): pp. 17
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Extreme Equilibria
The third approach now introduces another possibility to sanction a country,
that deviates from the chosen emission level. Again it is the maximization of
a weighted sum, but this time, out of the set of equilibrium payoffs (denoted
here as Ξ(g)) and not out of the feasibility set of all possible allocations15:
max
I∑
i=1
xiVi(g), V (g) ∈ Ξ(g)
Again one result is that there is an optimal emission rate for each country.
In the case that one country defects, all other nations will emit at a very high
rate (in fact the sum of this punishment emissions is higher then the BAU
emission level of the punishing countries) for one year. After the punishment
phase they switch to an equilibrium, where the deviating nation has the
lowest payoff of all possible outcomes. Here its weight in the maximization
process is reduced to zero, a(x−i) = [a(x1), ...a(xi−1), a(xi+1), ...a(xI)], such
that the punishing countries gain more than they loose in the period of
punishment (to make it clear, in the period of very high emissions all countries
in the world have higher cost but the new equilibrium bears enough gains to
compensate).
One might think that a country which is thrown out of the international
community does not have any incentive to emit at low rates of carbon dioxide
any more. But the opposite is true. As all other countries maximize joint
welfare excluding one nation, there is no more elbowroom for country i to
produce at a high level of ai because for any further emitted ai the cost
due to pollution will be higher then the marginal profit of one further unit
produced.
Again the punishment is itself an equilibrium, so it is credible for any country
to get to pay the bill in case of deviation. Furthermore if one state deviates,
the other countries can even increase their profits by punishing. This is very
15Do not confuse this with the results we gathered so far, see comparison of GPO, TBO
and SBO at the end of the chapter
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important, as it has been discussed, that the more the contracting countries
would have to sacrifice to discipline the deviant, the less credible is the threat
of punishment. The result is very easy to implement, because it carries with
it an across the board cut of emission levels.
Asymmetry
One critical aspect of the whole problem is that the different countries face
different consequences. While some suffer substantial damage, some other
might only have low costs. The question now is how this cost asymmetry
affects the results concerning sustainability of cuts, optimality of cuts and
welfare aspects.
For simplicity we consider only the case where the number of players is re-
duced to two. This can be interpreted as two regions such as the developed
north in contrast to the economically underdeveloped south. If the marginal
cost of another emitted giga ton of CO2 (gtc) of country i is high, the result
is that it gets less interesting to brake the treaty as the profits to gain are
low. Vice versa the threat of the sanction - the BAU emission level - gets
less severe for the lower cost country. Estimates show that the first effect is
stronger than the second one. That means that the country with the higher
cost will be more willing to cut down emissions, and that the lower cost coun-
try will always agree on a cut that is supported by the higher cost country.
Looking at the extent of inequality of cost, overall welfare is at its maximum
with GPO emissions, when costs are equal. If inequality increases, welfare
strictly decreases16.
Greenhouse Trap
An interesting question arises, if one looks for convergence. Therefore we
consider only Markov Perfect Equilibria, where the result is depending on
current GHG levels. The so called ’Greenhouse Trap’ states that a country
starting with an initial stock which is below a critical g∗ value will converge
16Dutta and Radner (2002): pp. 16-17
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towards this value and then stay there. On the other side, a nation that starts
above this critical value converges towards the unfortunate steady state of
BAU emissions.
Summary
• Business as Usual - BAU
Each Country maximizes its utility subject to its own emissions. The
result is that the whole world emits to much CO2, so the world climate
heats up and thereby produces significant cost. This is an equilibrium
in the one shot game.
• Global Pareto Optimum - GPO
Here a weighted sum of all countries utility is maximized subject to
emissions of GHG. The result is the maximum attainable global utility
in terms of GDP minus cost of the GHG stock. This is not an equilib-
rium in the one shot game. Therefore we need some kind of agreement
to get at least close to that result.
• Third Best Optimum - TBO
Now we introduce a first possibility of sanctioning countries, that do
not act according to what would be globally optimal. If one nation
emits to much CO2 all other countries start to emit on their BAU level
of GHGs ever after. By repetition of the game, countries do not dare
to deviate.
• Second Best Optimum - SBO
After a deviation of country i all other states emit at a very high rate for
one year. After this year, global welfare is recalculated under exclusion
of the deviant. Hence all countries can profit if they carry out the
punishment, even if they harm themselves at first.
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3.2 Extensions to the Basic Model
Now that the basic model is defined, I want to turn towards some aspects
that have not been covered so far.
3.2.1 Exogenous Population Change
The ’Global Warming Game’ is in general defined as in the section above.
The difference here is that exogenous population growth is taken into account.
That means that for a given population size there is an optimal level of energy
use and thus an optimal level of emissions. The population of country i, Pi(t),
is growing linear towards a steady state, Si, and stays at this level for ever:
Pi(t+ 1) = `iPi(t) + (1− `i)Si,
where `i lies between zero and one. The solution of this difference equation
is:
Pi(t) = `
t
iPi(0) + (1− `ti).
Now that we know the behavior of the new parameter, we can implement
it into the utility function, which is already known from the basic model:
υi(t) = hi[ai(t), Pi(t)]− ciPi(t)g(t) (3.2)
hi(t) is now depending not only on ai(t) alone but also on Pi(t), i.e. what
the GDP of country i would be, at a certain level of emissions and population
size. For each value of Pi, hi is strictly concave in ai. For a certain size of
population there is an optimal level of emissions, if one does not take into
account the cost of the stock of GHG17. And furthermore marginal costs are
linked proportional to the population of nation i.
17Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 257
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The decision variable is than the discounted sum of payoffs over the infinite
future:
υi =
∞∑
t=0
δtυi(t)
Two Benchmarks
We now investigate, how the basic model changes after including the new
variable.
BAU
The BAU emission level is linked to the current population of country i,
and not to any other countries population level. Optimal emissions are than
defined over the maximization of the welfare function, subject to the emission
level:
hi1(a
∗
i , Pi) = δwi(P
′
i )
wi(Pi) = ci
(
Si
1− δσ −
Si − Pi
1− δσ`i
)
where hi1 is the first derivative of h, subject to a. Here player i plays the
Markovian strategy a∗i = α
∗
i (Pi) with the payoff:
V ∗i (g, P ) = u
∗
i (P )− wi(Pi)g
where g is the initial stock of GHG and P = (P1, . . . PI) is the popu-
lation vector. The function u∗i is bounded, continuous and separable in its
arguments. That means that there exist the functions ui∗i (Pi) and u
j∗
i (Pi, Pj)
that are also bounded and continuous. These functions solve the following
equations:
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ui∗i (Pi) = hi[α
∗
i (Pi), Pi] + δ[u
i∗
i (P
′
i )− wi(P
′
i )a
∗
i (Pi)]
uj∗i (Pi, Pj) = −δwi(P
′
i )a
∗
j(Pj) + δu
j∗
i (P
′
i , P
′
j
P
′ ≡ (P ′i )
P
′
i ≡ `iPi + (1− `i)Si
ui∗i (Pi) is the utility of country i derived from the population of its own
country that enters the value function V ∗i
18. While uj∗i (Pi, Pj) is the disutility
of country i that is caused by the population of country j19:
ui∗i (Pi) +
I∑
j 6=i
uj∗i (Pi, Pj) = maxai
[hi(α
∗
i , Pi) + δ[u
i∗
i (P
′
i )− wi(P
′
i )a
∗
i ]
+δ
I∑
j 6=i
[−wi(P ′i )a∗j(Pj) + uj∗i (P
′
i , P
′
j )]
The space of bounded, continuous, separable functions is a complete, sep-
arable metric space. The Bellman Equation20 is a contraction and therefore
it has a fixed point which is the value function. BAU emissions result from
the first order condition of the maximization of the utility function defined
above21:
hi1(ai, Pi)− δwi(P ′i ) = 0
18”A value function is an estimate of expected cumulative future reward,
usually as a function of state or state-action pair. The reward may be
discounted, with lesser weight being given to delayed reward [...]” (from
http://rlai.cs.ualberta.ca/RLAI/valuefunctionhypothesis.html at 2007/11/03 - 15:00). It
displays the present discounted value of the allocation denoted by its arguments.
19Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 258
20The Bellman Equation is a necessary condition for optimality when using dynamic
programming, see also Sundaram (1999): pp. 285 et seq.
21Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 258
A correspondence is a multivalued function, a fixed point of a correspondence is a coordi-
nate where there is no possible additional value added.
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So the emission level is independent of the GHG stock and the BAU is a
MPE. The value of wi(Pi) is determined by the cost equation
22:
wi(Pi)g = ciPig + δwi(P
′
i )σg
GPO
A Global Pareto Optimum is a profile of strategies that maximizes the
weighted sum of country payoffs:
υ =
∑
i
xiυi
where the weights sum up to one. The maximum achievable welfare is
given by:
V̂ (g) = u(P )− w(P )g
u(P ) =
∑
j
xjuj(P )
w(P ) =
∑
j
xjwj(Pj)
The technical properties are almost the same as in the BAU case, with
the little difference that in this case a weighted sum is maximized instead of
one countries utility:
ui(P ) = hi[αi(Pi), Pi] + δ[ui(P
′
i )− wi(P
′
)
∑
j
αj(Pj)]
where αi is implicitly described by the first derivative of the welfare func-
tion23:
22Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 258
23Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 259
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xihi1[αi(Pi), Pi] = δw(P
′
)
or hi1[αi(Pi), Pi] = δ
(
1
xi
)∑
j
xjwj(pj)
Comparison of the Results
Comparing those two benchmark emission levels it turns out that under any
circumstances the GPO emissions are lower than the BAU ones:
hi1[α
∗
i (Pi), Pi] = δwi(Pi)
hi1[α̂i(Pi), Pi] = δ
(
1
xi
)∑
j
xjwj(Pj)
The BAU emission level exceeds the GPO one, if:
hi1[α
∗
i (Pi), Pi] < hi1[α̂i(Pi), Pi]
δwi(Pi) < δ
(
1
xi
)∑
j
xjwj(Pj)
xiwi(Pi) <
∑
j
xjwj(Pj)
which is true for all weights.
As the function h is strictly concave, BAU value α∗i (Pi) is strictly greater then
GPO value α̂i(Pi), which holds for all weights. This is not really surprising,
but it had to be shown that it is still true in the new framework24.
24Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 260
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Effects of population size on emission levels
Constant Population
This would be the case for instant when the population has finally grown to
the steady state. The theory is exactly the same as in the standard model,
discussed at the previous section.
Growing Population
Now that we have adjusted the basic model for a growing population, we
want to know what the effects of a growing society on a countries’ emission
level are. The central term is the cross partial derivative of the net welfare
function:
hi12 − δci`i
1− δσ`i > 0
If this term is positive it means that the marginal product of GDP with
respect to emissions is augmenting in the population size. In other words, if
the number of inhabitants of a country increases, the emitted amount of CO2
is growing as well. This would be the case when the production function -
representing the structure of GDP - takes the form which we already used as
an example in the previous section25:
hi(ai, Pi) = φiK
γi
i P
1−γi−βi
i
(
ai(t)
fi
)βi
− pi
(
ai(t)
fi
)
3.2.2 A Change in the Emission Factor
Exogenous Technological Change
It is rather clear that to achieve a cut in GHG emissions, production technolo-
gies have to become more efficient. In this framework technological progress
25Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 261-262
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enters the model over a reduction of the energy input by increasing the emis-
sion factor. This can only be reached by research and development efforts.
If the reduction of GHGs can be met within the BAU, the threat of BAU
and the corresponding SBO and TBO get less powerful.
In the article the authors presume that emission of CO2 is only caused by
production of energy. Furthermore energy is an input of the production func-
tion, just like capital and labor. The use of energy is then determined by the
emissions and an emission factor that represents the effectiveness of energy
production. So the question is, what is the resulting change of GHG emis-
sions, if the emission factor changes?
The easier case is the one, where technological change is an exogenous factor
in the model. The output is defined as Yi(ei, Pi) and country i’s emissions as
ai = eifi. GDP in period t is:
hi(ai, Pi; fi) ≡ Yi
(
ai
fi
, Pi
)
and welfare in period t is:
υi(ai, Pi; fi) = hi(ai, Pi; fi)− ciPig
where the emission factor fi remains constant.
Effects of reducing emission factors
Until now the strategic variable in the maximization problem was ai, the
amount of emissions. As the emissions are defined now as the product of
energy use and the efficiency of technology, the model changes as follows:
A(t) ≡
I∑
i=1
fiei(t)
The BAU energy input is then defined by the solution of these equations26:
26Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 266
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hi1(e
∗
i , Pi) = fiδwi(P
′
i )
wi(P
′
i ) = ci
(
Si
1− δσ −
`i(Si − Pi)
1− δσ`i
)
where e∗ is the BAU energy consumption. Research and development that
’decarbonizes’ energy inputs without increasing the price of energy would
have the effect of decreasing the emission factors. The effect of an increasing
emission factor on the emissions is:
∂a∗i
∂fi
= e∗i + fi
∂e∗i
∂fi
If the energy use was constant, then a lower emission factor would result
in lower emissions. But as hi1 is strictly concave and population does not
change, when technology evolves, the only variable that changes is ei. It is
not intuitively clear but in this framework, a better technology can result in
higher emissions27, if:
∂e∗i
∂fi
< 0 and hence
∂a∗i
∂fi
> 0
which is true, if and only if:
(
∂loge∗i
∂logfi
)
=
(
∂e∗i
∂fi
)(
fi
ei
)
> −1
The lhs gives the elasticity of energy use with respect to the emission
factor28. A characterization of the BAU with emission factor as a parameter
is sufficient, as the computation of the two benchmarks is rather similar, so
there is no need to do it twice.
27For instance there are studies which find increasing energy use after houses got better
temperature insulation. People tend to heat more rooms if they believe that fever energy
is lost
28Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 267
43
Endogenous Technological Change
In the article ”A game-theoretic approach to global warming” previous re-
sults are summarized and some parts are getting more detailed. Especially
the functional forms of the benchmarks (BAU and GPO) are enhanced, by
a term for technological progress. A variable that measures the explicit cost
of a new technology to reduce emissions is taken into account now:
ki[fi(t)− fi(t+ 1)]
The costs are proportional to the reduction, which gets into force in the
period after the effort is undertaken. Furthermore a constraint is introduced
that restricts the physical borders of emission reduction by29:
mi ≤ fi(t+ 1) ≤ fi(t).
It is essential for the sustainability of an equilibrium pareto superior to
the BAU, that the emission factor is greater then zero. Imagine all countries
of the world except one would set mi = 0. Now that one country could
defect, without having to fear any credible threat as all other countries had
given up their ability to pollute30. Bringing this new factors together, the
utility function changes as follows31:
υi(t) = Yi[ei(t)]− cig(t)− ki[fi(t)− fi(t+ 1)]
A countries strategy determines for each period its energy use and emis-
sion factor. A stationary strategy for country i is a strategy that is indepen-
dent of the entire history of the play and only depends on the current state,
s(t) = [f(t),g(t)]. One such strategy is again the Business as Usual.
29Dutta and Radner (2006b): pp. 139
30Dutta and Radner (2006): pp. 145
31Dutta and Radner (2006): pp. 139
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Choosing the optimal emission factor
In this last step of modification of the basic model, energy use itself is now a
function of the emission factor, i.e. ei(t) = Ei[fi(t)] and next years emission
factor is depending on the actual parameter value of f, fi(t+ 1) = Fi[fi(t)]
32.
As in the BAU players use a Markovian strategy, f will be constant over time
after period 0. Optimal energy consumption is defined implicitly over taking
the first derivative of the production function:
Y
′
i [Ei(y)] = δwiy
The next step is to compute the optimal emission factor, which is denoted
by y. Therefore a new formula, namely Zi(y), is introduced. It does not make
sense intuitively but the implications will make it pretty easy to see:
Zi(y) = kiy +
(
δ
1− δ
)
Yi[Ei(y)]− δwiyEi(y)
Do not mix it up with the welfare function υi. This function consists of
the costs of reducing the emission factor by one unit times the optimal level
of the individual fi - hiy - plus the discounted profits minus the environmen-
tal costs of energy use. Given that Yi is concave, Ei(y) is decreasing with y,
i.e. ∂Ei(y)
∂y
< 0, so Zi is convex.
The interesting thing about that can be seen when looking at the first deriva-
tive:
Z
′
i(y) = k −
(
δ2wi
1− δ
)
Ei(y)
y lies in the interval [mi, fi], so the function reaches its maximum at
one of the endpoints. There are two possibilities. When Z
′
i(mi) > 0, then
32Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 140
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Fi(fi) = fi
33, ∀fi > mi34.
If Z
′
i(mi) < 0, then there exists an y
0
i > mi such that:
Fi(fi) = mi for fi < y
0
i
or Fi(fi) = fi for fi > y
0
i
That means that if the slope of the function in the point mi is positive,
the maximum lies above it. The second case is, that the slope is negative.
Here it depends on the value of y0i , which states whether Zi reaches its max-
imum at mi or fi
35.
The sign of Z
′
i (either positive or negative) shows whether the cost of in-
venting cleaner technologies (k) is smaller or greater than the environmental
costs of energy use (
(
δ2wi
1−δ
)
Ei(y)). To see this, it is useful to rewrite the
preceding equations:
Z
′
i(y) < 0 ⇔ k <
(
δ2wi
1− δ
)
Ei(y)
Z
′
i(y) > 0 ⇔ k >
(
δ2wi
1− δ
)
Ei(y)
Effects of reducing emission factors
The calculation of BAU and GPO emission levels, respectively energy inputs,
is technically the same as shown in the previous chapters and therefore I will
not repeat that again. In this point the question should be answered, whether
the move from a BAU to a GPO reduces the emissions of all countries.
Somewhat paradoxically, an improvement of the production technology, i.e.
a lower emission factor, need not necessarily lead to lower emissions in GPO
for that country36.
33don’t forget fi(t+ 1) = Fi(fi)
34Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 141
35Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 142
36Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 144
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The proof has to be extended for the fact, that energy use itself is a function
now, namely ei = Ei(fi). Hence, emissions are now defined over ai = fiEi(fi),
and its reaction on a change in the emission factor is given by:
∂ai
∂fi
= Ei(fi) + fiE
′
i(fi)
We already know that E
′
i(fi) < 0, so again, the following constraint has
to be fulfilled, such that ∂ai
∂fi
> 0:
(
∂logEi(fi)
∂logfi
)
= E
′
i(fi)
(
fi
Ei(fi)
)
> −1
The switch from BAU to GPO with the same initial state will not increase
any country’s emission factor. Furthermore a switch from a BAU to a GPO
will decrease every countries emissions in every period and thereby increase
global welfare37.
How to sustain such a GPO, while every nation has incentives to deviate
in order to gain higher profits, was already shown in the previous sections.
The extensions to the basic model do not change the technical aspects.
37Dutta and Radner (2006a): pp. 144
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Chapter 4
Final Remarks
4.1 Some ideas for further research
From my point of view there remain two questions, that are not answered by
the models that I presented. First, how would the equilibria change if it was
possible to invest in the technology of another country. That would reduce
the global stock of the pollutant and at the same time enables additional
production, and hence emission entitlements, for the investing country. And
second, it has always been stated that the size of damage is not yet clear and
so there remains some insecurity about the real cost of global warming.
I will only sketch my ideas, that could stand behind the mechanisms and try
to enhance the Model of Dutta and Radner.
Fitting the Clean Development Mechanism into the Model
CDM was invented during the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol. The idea
was to promote investment in foreign technology such that global emissions
would decrease. Parts of the cuts could then be accounted for the investor,
hence she could produce a bit more. This should downsize the technologi-
cal gap between higher and lower developed countries and make production
cleaner.
From the chapter on endogenous technological change we know the term
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ki[fi(t) − fi(t + 1)] that represents costs of investing in cleaner technologies
and hence a lower emission factor of country i. To enable country i to invest
in other states technology as well, I denote its cost of foreign investment
by kij, i.e. investment flows from nation i to j. Country i’s own research
effort is kii = ki[fi(t) − fi(t + 1)] and kji are FDIs from j to i. A function
k = ζi(kij, kji) sums up each k
1:
k = kii +
I∑
j 6=i
kij −
I∑
j 6=i
kji
The new k does not change the calculations, already done in the preceding
chapter. It is simply a further broadening of the framework, trying to make
the model even more realistic. So utility of country i is still:
υi(t) = Yi[ei(t)]− cig(t)− k
Note that kij does not influence the emission factor of nation i, but the
one of j.
It is easy to see, that in this enhanced framework, all countries will foster
technological progress where the effect is biggest, in relation to the arising
capital requirements. For instance new low emission power plants in eco-
nomically lower developed countries, replacing those burning fossil fuels to
produce electricity, would reduce the global stock of GHGs substantially and
thereby lower the investors cost of climate change. As a result production
of goods could be undertaken at a higher level and hence welfare increases.
The good thing about this result is, that the punishment mechanisms remain
effective. Because better production technologies do not reduce the ’optimal’
level of the GHG stock, but foster outcome and welfare. If one country de-
cides to deviate from the cooperation strategy, the other nations can react
the same way as described so far.
Unfortunately the Kyoto Protocol restricts the possibilities of reducing emis-
sions abroad, as it aims to lower CO2 production at the national level mainly.
1kii must not be taken into account twice
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Fitting Stochastic Cost into the Model
As it was already mentioned in the introduction, the real dimension of climate
change is not yet foreseeable. So a major concern is to implement some degree
of uncertainty about the possible cost into the model. This would influence
the factor ci(g) = pi(c
l
ig) + (1 − pi)(chi g), where l and h denote whether the
cost of country i is low or high. Thereby the menace of joint higher emitting
of CO2 as a punishment in case of deviation of a player is decreased, if cost
is low, or increased, if cost is high:
υi(t) = Yi[ei(t)]− [pi(clig) + (1− pi)(chi g)]− ki(fi)
As long as countries believe that (1− pi) (the chance that cost is high) is
larger then some benchmark level (1−pi), they will rather cooperate because
punishment is assumed to be substantially. As soon as pi exceeds the thresh-
old pi and thus environmental cost could be low, all countries would switch
to the BAU strategy.
4.2 Conclusion
The main motivation to occupy myself with the matter of global warming
was the question, why do all efforts in cutting down the emissions of anthro-
pogenic gases have no observable effect on the behavior of some states of
the world. At the beginning of my investigations I identified three different
approaches. The first one is a more political one, that states that market
driven mechanisms are not effective in international negotiations and it is
a logic result that international environmental agreements do not work in
reality. Other authors argue, that it is necessary to combine a bunch of ac-
tions, including both different kinds of transfers and punishments, to create
the right positive and negative incentives for the countries involved. A third
fraction holds the view, that the whole problem could be handled like a pris-
oners dilemma situation, in which the infinite repetition of the same game
50
would bear the desired results. But the representatives of this approach are
not homogeneous, as some believe that fully global cooperation could never
be achieved and only the formation of coalitions can be successful. Unfor-
tunately the gains of cooperation might not be high enough to reach this
goal, as Barrett and Stavins as well as Dockner and Long argue. Only under
certain circumstances and with some kind of communication agents act in
an ecological reasonable way.
As I did not share any of these views completely, I tried to build my ar-
gumentation on a framework, that is applied by the game theorists Dutta
and Radner. Their models bear the advantage that they try to cover much
more factors then just emission abatement or production level respectively
and hence enable to turn more then one cogwheel in the machinery of the
world. A basic assumption is, that it is in every countries self interest to
cooperate because the global common harms every country to some extent.
So I do not look for reasons for participation but for possible ways to make
all nations comply. It turns out that an agreement must include some form
of punishment mechanism to be able to enforce the stipulated emission level,
which is the crucial point. Many articles conclude that punishment is not
realistic, because some countries would probably have to sacrifice national
welfare in case of joint action against a deviant. The solution for that does
not meet the eye intuitively. In the first two models, that I present, pun-
ishment in form of lower levels of cooperation does not always succeed. The
punishment itself has to be an equilibrium, in order to be a credible threat to
any player considering deviation. If that can be assured, it is easy to sustain
cooperation, at least at some level. Therefore the crucial factors are how
patient the countries are and that they behave rational.
Thence I conclude that it is possible to find ways to reduce international CO2
emissions and save the worlds ecological equilibrium. Recent developments
show that political and economic leaders get more and more aware of the
threats of global warming.
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Chapter 5
Appendix
Abstract
By now all international efforts to cut down emissions of Green House Gases
had no observable effect on countries behavior. When dealing with the the-
ory behind the matter of global warming, one can identify various approaches
for possible solutions. I apply models in which the problem is handled like a
prisoners dilemma. That means that when the game is repeated only once,
every agent can increase individual utility by not cooperating. But when
the game is repeated infinitely often the other players can punish a country
that is not willing to act according to an agreement. It is important that
the threat of punishment is credible, because as soon as countries believe
that they might not be punished they will try to free ride. Therefore the
punishment must be an equilibrium itself.
In the models that I use, the threat is a situation in which every nation
maximizes its own welfare, considering only its own harm due to environ-
mental pollution. It is a subgame perfect equilibrium and hence it is always
realistic, that countries fall back to that behavior when punishment gets nec-
essary. As this result might not bear highest global welfare, I further describe
a mechanism in which only the deviant is worse off, while all other nations
can increase their utility. The level of abatement that can be achieved in a
repeated game, is then depending on the patience of the players.
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Bisher hatten sämtliche internationalen Bemühungen den Ausstoß von Treib-
hausgasen zu begrenzen keinen Einfluss auf das Verhalten der Länder. Wenn 
man sich mit der Theorie beschäftigt, die es zur Problematik der globalen Er-
wärmung gibt, findet man verschiedenste Lösungsansätze. Ich verwende Mo-
delle, in denen das Problem wie ein Gefangenen Dilemma behandelt wird. Das 
heißt, dass die Spieler ihren individuellen Nutzen maximieren können, indem 
sie nicht kooperieren, wenn das Spiel nur ein Mal durchgeführt wird. Aber 
wenn das Spiel unendlich oft wiederholt wird, haben die Staaten die Möglich-
keit ein Land, das sich nicht gemäß der Vereinbarung verhält, zu bestrafen. Es 
ist sehr wichtig, dass dieses Drohpotential als glaubwürdig angesehen wird. 
Denn sobald die Länder glauben könnten, dass sie möglicherweise nicht mit ei-
ner Strafe zu rechnen haben, werden sie ein so genanntes Trittbrettfahrer-
Verhalten an den Tag legen. Daher muss die Strafe selbst ein Gleichgewicht 
sein. 
In den Modellen, die ich verwende, ist die Strafandrohung die Situation in der 
alle Länder ihre eigene Wohlfahrt maximieren, dabei aber nur ihre eigenen 
Kosten der Umweltverschmutzung in Betracht ziehen. Das ist ein Teilspiel per-
fektes Gleichgewicht und stellt damit eine realistische Bedrohung dar, in dem 
Sinn, dass alle anderen Länder in dieses Verhalten zurückfallen, wenn Bestra-
fung notwendig werden sollte. Dieses Resultat bringt allerdings nicht immer 
das höchste globale Nutzenniveau mit sich. Ich beschreibe im Anschluß noch 
einen weiteren Strafmechanismus, bei dem nur das abweichende Land schlech-
ter gestellt wird, während alle anderen Staaten ihren Nutzen noch erhöhen kön-
nen. Das konkrete Ausmaß der Emissions Reduktion, das in diesem wiederhol-
ten Spiel erreicht werden kann, hängt dann wesentlich von der Höhe der Geduld 
der Spieler ab. 
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